Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

Gilbert R. Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, National
Union Fire INsurance Company of Pittsburgh,
Second Injury Fund, Utah State Industrial
Commission : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael E. Dyer; Stephanie A. Mallory; Richards, Brandt, Miller and Nelson; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Stuart L. Poelman; Larry R. Laycock; Snow, Christensen and Martineau; Erie Boorman; Attorneys
for Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Wilburn v. Interstate Electric, No. 880086.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1980

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

'«»!

UTAH
DOCUMBf
KFU
45.9
.S9
DOCKET NT

-pae*

APklUU'.

8SOCS6

ci*h, Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Applicant/Appellant,
Certiorari Docket No. 880086

vs.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Priority No. 13

Defendants/Respondents.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS INTERSTATE
ELECTRIC AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF PITTSBURGH IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT/APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stuart L. Poelman (A-2619)
Larry R. Laycock (A-4868)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents Interstate Electric
and National Union Fire
Insurance Company

Michael E. Dyer
Stephanie A. Mallory
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
P.O. BOX 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Attorneys for Appellant
Gilbert R. Wilburn

Erie Boorman, Administrator
SECOND INJURY FUND
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Telephone: (801) 530-6820
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Second Injury Fund
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
GILBERT R. WILBURN,
Applicant/Appel1ant,
Certiorari Docket No. 880086

vs.
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, NATIONAL
UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
PITTSBURGH, SECOND INJURY FUND
and UTAH STATE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION,

Priority No. 13

Defendants/Respondents,
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS INTERSTATE
ELECTRIC AND NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF PITTSBURGH IN OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT/APPELLANT'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stuart L. Poelman (A-2619)
Larry R. Laycock (A-4868)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
Attorneys for Defendants/
Respondents Interstate Electric
and National Union Fire
Insurance Company

Michael E. Dyer
Stephanie A. Mailory
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
Attorneys for Appellant
Gilbert R. Wilburn

Erie Boorman, Administrator
SECOND INJURY FUND
P.O. Box 45580
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580
Telephone: (801) 530-6820
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
Second Injury Fund
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE AND RULES

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

A.

Nature Of The Case

B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition

C.

2

By The Court Of Appeals

2

Statement Of Facts

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT I

POINT II

10
WILBURN'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED
A•
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974)
Is Nor Bar To Enforceability Of
The Settlement Agreement Because
Sufficient Evidence Supports The
Commission's Finding That The
Parties Had A Good Faith Dispute
As To The Compensability Of
Wilburn's Claim
B.
The Court Of Appeals Did Not Decide
An Important Question Of State Law,
As Yet Undecided By This Court Or
In Conflict With A Decision Of This
Court

14

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WILL NOT BE GRANTED
FOR AN APPEAL WHICH IS BASED ON A FACTUAL
DISPUTE

16

CONCLUSION

10

12

18

-l-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes and Rules:
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1987)

17

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974)

4,11,
12

Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah Supreme Court,
56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1987)

10

Cases:
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of County
Commissioners, Etc.,
584 P.2d 1371 (Or. 1978)
Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial Commission,
732 P.2d 508, (Utah 1987)
Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Commission,
103 Utah 371, 135 P. 2d 266 (1943)
Bogqess v. Morris,
635 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981)

11,12
13
14
11

Briqham Young University v. Industrial Commission,
74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889 (1929)
Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall,
28 Utah 2d 14, 497 P. 2d 638 (1972)

14,17
17

Department of Administrative Services v. Public Serv.
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983)

17

Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi,
631 P. 2d 888 (Utah 1981)

16

McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial Commission,
598 P. 2d 375 (Utah 1979)

13

Mast v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137 (1984)

11

Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,
658 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1983)

18

-ii-

Overson v. U.S.F.&G.,
587 P.2d 149 (Utah 1978)
State v. McAllister,
708 P.2d 239 (Mont. 1985)
Wilburn v. Interstate Electric,
74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah App. 1
Wilson v. Industrial Commission,
735 P.2d 403 (Utah App. 1987)

-iii-

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals properly affirm the

Industrial Commission's final decision by holding that:
A.

Section 35-1-90 is no bar to the enforceability of the

Settlement Agreement?
B.

There was ample evidence to support the judge's

finding that, as a matter of fact, "the agreement was validly
executed by the parties as a settlement of a disputed claim,
including for permanent total disability benefits."

Wilburn v.

Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah App. 1988);
and
C.

Maximum deference should be given "to the basic facts

determined by the agency, which will be sustained if there is
evidence of any substance that can be reasonably regarded as
supporting the determination made?

Id.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE, RULES AND CASE
The Statute, Rules and Case Authority relevant to a
determinative resolution of the present case are:

(1) Utah

Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974); (2) Rules 42-43, Rules of Utah
Supreme Court, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (1987); and (3) Wilburn v.
Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah App. 1988).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature Of The Case:

This case arises out of applicant's alleged industrial
accident and related claim for permanent total disability
benefits, under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
B.

Course Of Proceedings And Disposition By The Court Of
Appeals:

1.

On February 13, 1986, Gilbert R. Wilburn ("Wilburn"),

filed an application with the Industrial Commission seeking
permanent total disability benefits from defendants.

(R. 43.)

Defendants answered the application asserting various defenses,
including the fact that the claim was barred by a previously
entered Settlement Agreement.
2.

(R. 44-45.)

On May 14, 1986, Administrative Law Judge Richard

Sumsion reviewed Wilburn's application.

(R. 49.) On May 28,

1986, Judge Sumsion issued Tentative Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order, finding Wilburn to be permanently
and totally disabled.
3.

(R. 338-345.)

Pursuant to defendants' Motion for Review and Clarifi-

cation (R. 357-371), Judge Sumsion issued Supplemental Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, vacating his prior
Interim Order of May 28, 1986, and ruling that the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") entered into between the
parties and approved by the Commission on November 28, 1984,
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was binding and precluded the applicant from asserting his
claim for permanent total disability.
4.

(R. 372-376.)

Counsel for Wilburn obtained review of the

Supplemental Order by the full Commission.

(R. 377.)

Memoranda discussing all of the issues raised in this appeal
were then submitted to the Commission for review.
380-406.)

The Commission denied Wilburn's Motion for Review,

with all three commissioners concurring.
5.

(R.

(R. 407.)

The Industrial Commission made the following

significant factual determinations:
(a) Defendants, in good faith, asserted the defense
that the alleged event did not constitute a compensable
"accident." (R. 339.)
(b) Wilburn clearly contemplated asserting a claim
for permanent total disability several months before he
executed the Agreement. (R. 341.)
(c) The parties clearly understood that the trade-off
contemplated by the Agreement included a relinquishment of
Wilburn's claim for permanent total disability. (R. 341.)
(d) The Parties stipulated in the Agreement itself
that there was a bona fide issue as to the compensability of
the applicant's claim at the time of the Agreement. (R. 38.)
(e) The Agreement was approved by the Industrial
Commission's legal counsel. (R. 40.)
(f) Settlement of industrial claims is usually a
desirable objective from a policy standpoint. (R. 373.)
(g) Wilburn was advised to and did discuss his claim
with an attorney prior to signing the Agreement. (R. 373.)
(h) Wilburn discussed the Agreement with the
Commission's legal counsel who approved the settlement after
discussing all of its ramifications with Wilburn. (R. 373.)
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(i) Wilburn gave long and serious consideration to
execution of the Agreement, which was not prepared on the spur
of the moment and signed hastily. (R. 373.)
(j) Wilburn understood the possibility of losing
medical
benefits
if he were to lose his claim on the issue of
n
no accident." (R. 373.)
(k) A settlement agreement such as that entered into
by Wilburn is valid under Utah law when an issue concerning the
compensability of the claim is at issue. (R. 372.)
(1) To invalidate Wilburn's Agreement would seriously
undermine the entire settlement process, rendering such process
so uncertain and unpredictable as to seldom be worthy of
serious consideration. (R. 374.)
6.

The Commission affirmed the Order of the Adminis-

trative Law Judge on September 9, 1986.

On October 7, 1986,

Wilburn filed a Petition for Writ of Review with this Court,
which was remanded to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition.
7.

On review, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the

Industrial Commission Order, holding that (1) Wilburn released
his claim for permanent total disability benefits upon signing
the Settlement Agreement; and (2) that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90
(1974) "is no bar to enforceability of the agreement."

Wilburn

v. Interstate Electric, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah App.
1988).

The instant Petition for Writ of Certiorari followed.

C.

Statement Of Facts:

1.

On or about April 14, 1980, Wilburn, while working for

Interstate Electric lifted a small portable generator from the
floor to his workbench.

This activity was neither unusual nor
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unexpected, but rather, was a routine work function performed
on a regular basis.
2.

(R. 84-85.)

Mr. Wilburn indicated that he did not feel pain in his

back until five to ten minutes after the described lifting.
(R. 350-351.)
3.

Wilburn consulted Dr. Gene Smith the following day

concerning low back pains.

Dr. Smith examined Wilburn and

released him to his regular work within a few days.

Wilburn

took three days off work, underwent physical therapy for two to
three weeks and then continued to work for over a year without
additional medical treatment.
4.

(R. 1, 59-60, 65, 297.)

On February 2, 1981, Dr. Wallace Hess examined Wilburn

to determine a disability rating which was found to be a 5%
permanent partial disability from the claimed work injury plus
a 15% permanent partial disability due to a pre-existing low
back condition.

(R. 177-180.)

Based upon this rating, Wilburn

received permanent partial disability of 20% benefits, with the
employer and the Second Injury Fund paying their pro-rata
shares.
5.

(R. 102.)
After April, 1980, Wilburn did not receive any

additional medical treatment for his low back injury until
August 18, 1981, when he saw Dr. Gordon Affleck.
laid off work on July 31, 1981.

Wilburn was

(R. 11, 65-66, 297.) Dr.

Affleck placed Wilburn on temporary total disability which was
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paid by the employer from August, 1981 until September 30,
1983.
6.

(R. 298-300.)
On June 20, 1983, Dr. Hess re-examined Wilburn, noting

a degeneration of Wilburn's arthritic condition, especially as
it affected his neck and ankles, a condition unrelated to the
industrial injury.

Dr. Hess determined that the permanent

partial disability was a combined total of 36% with 10%
assigned to the claimed industrial injury, 15% assigned to
pre-existing arthritis in the low back, and 15% assigned to a
non-industrial cervical spine condition.
7.

(R. 181-189.)

Sometime in late 1983, Wilburn consulted with

Administrative Law Judge Jan Moffitt at the Industrial
Commission, who advised him to make a claim for permanent total
disability.

She referred Mr. Wilburn to Attorney Robert

Shaughnessy, with whom he then consulted.
8.

(R. 122-123, 322.)

By report dated February 1, 1984, Dr. Affleck stated:

"Mr. Wilburn is not capable of any significant employment,
especially in the area that he has any training or capability
in."

(R. 248.)

Thereafter, Wilburn contacted National Union

Fire Insurance Company ("National Union"), the workers'
compensation insurance carrier, claiming additional continuing
disability compensation, and was then referred by the carrier
to its attorney, Stuart L. Poelman, who met with Wilburn on
February 24, 1984.

(R. 31.)
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9.

While meeting with Wilburn, Mr. Poelman explained that

the employer and its insurance carrier could raise several
defenses to Wilburn's claim for Permanent disability, including
a defense that the events of April 14, 1980, as described by
Wilburn in his statement, did not constitute an industrial
"accident" under the then existing legal interpretation of that
concept.

Wilburn understood from the discussion that if the

employer and its insurance carrier were successful in asserting
such defense, he would lose his claim for all additional
compensation, including future medical expenses.

On April 26,

1984, Wilburn talked again with Mr. Poelman, at which time
Wilburn noted his assertion of a claim for permanent total
disability and a discussion was had concerning the effect of
defendants' "no accident" defense.
the advice of other counsel.

Wilburn was told to seek

Wilburn suggested, and

Mr. Poelman concurred, that Wilburn should confer with Judge
Jan Moffitt or Judge Tim Allen at the Industrial Commission.
Settlement alternatives were discussed, and Wilburn offered to
settle for an additional 10% permanent partial disability.
(R. 129-130, 322-323.)

Thereafter, the parties reached a

verbal agreement and Mr. Poelman prepared a Compromise and
Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") which was sent to Wilburn on
May 31, 1984. (R. 35, 115.)
10.

In June, 1984, Wilburn consulted with Attorney Shaun

Howell, legal counsel for the Industrial Commission, and asked
-7-

her for her advice concerning the Agreement.
117-119.)

(R. 112,

From that consultation, Wilburn understood the risk

he might take by pursuing his claim to a hearing.

(R. 117.)

Attorney Howell met with Wilburn on various occasions: first
when he brought in an application seeking a continuation of
total disability benefits and indicated that he was going to
make a claim for permanent total disability; second, when he
delivered some medical records to Ms. Howell for her review;
and finally when he brought in a copy of the written Settlement
Agreement for review.
11.

(R. 134-138.)

Attorney Howell testified at the hearing before the

Industrial Commission that during the discussions it was clear
that Wilburn was asserting a claim for permanent total
disability, that Wilburn knew of the defenses which had been
explained to him by Mr. Poelman, and that Ms. Howell discussed
those defenses with Mr. Wilburn, including the "no accident"
defense which, if successful, would bar him from entitlement to
future medical expenses.
12.

(R. 113-114, 141, 145.)

After considering the initial Agreement, Wilburn asked

for payment of an additional $1,590.00 for temporary total
disability for the period of September 30, 1983 to November 22,
1983.

Defendants agreed and the Agreement was then revised and

sent to Wilburn for signature.

Wilburn read the Agreement,

asked Judge Moffitt about it, and signed it.
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(R. 115, 144.)

The Settlement Agreement was then sent to the Industrial Commission on November 1, 1984, and was approved by the Commission
through its legal counsel, Shaun Howell, on November 28, 1984.
(R. 36, 40.)

Defendants made payment to Wilburn as specified

by the Agreement.
12.

(R. 115-116.)

Wilburn entered into the Agreement when he was age 63

and had not worked for over three years.

(R. 119.)

Wilburn

was then on total disability under Social Security and was
claiming that he could not work.

(R. 93, 119.) At the time

the Agreement was entered, defendants understood that the
Agreement compromised and settled Wilburn's claim for permanent
total disability.

(R. 151.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Wilburn's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is ill founded
for at least three significant reasons.

First, review by writ

of certiorari is not appropriate in the instant case because
Wilburn fails to satisfy any justification that this court
considers in granting such a writ.

Second, Wilburn improperly

urges this Court to reevaluate Industrial Commission factual
determinations.

Finally, Wilburn mistakes the standard of

review applied in the Wilburn decision, confusing affirmance of
the Commission's Order which was based on well supported
factual determinations with a supposed interpretation of law.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
WILBURN'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
SHOULD BE DENIED.
In his Petition, Wilburn seeks review of various Industrial
Commission factual determinations, including whether (1) defendants raised the "no accident" defense in good faith; (2) it
was arbitrary or capricious to uphold the parties' Settlement
Agreement; and (3) the Parol Evidence Rule was properly
applied.

Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

requires that there be some "special and important reasons" for
granting a petition for writ of certiorari.1

As set forth in

detail below, re-evaluation of factual determinations is not
considered sufficient justification for granting such a writ.

••-The pertinent portion of Rule 43, Rules of the Utah Supreme
Court, provides that:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted
only when there are special and important reasons
therefor. The following . . . indicate the character
of reasons that will be considered: . . . (2) When a
panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question
of state or federal law in a way that is in conflict
with a decision of this Court; . . . (4) When the
Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been,
but should be, settled by this Court. (Emphasis
added.) Review of Judgments, Orders, and Decrees of
Court of Appeals, 56 Utah Adv. Rep. 38-39. (May 4,
1987).
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In interpreting the strict standard for granting a petition
for writ of certiorari, this Court noted that even where some
special and important reason has been demonstrated, "certiorari
is [still] a discretionary writ."
39, 42 (Utah 1981).

Boggess v. Morris, 635 P.2d

Indeed, "discretion must be used sparingly

so as not to undermine . . . limits on the time and manner of
appellate review."

Boggess, 635 P.2d at 42.

The function of the Supreme Court in this posture is to
review Court of Appeals decisions only where substantial issues
of law exist or serious error has occurred.

See Mast v.

Standard Oil Co. of California, 140 Ariz. 1, 680 P.2d 137, 138
(1984).

Faced with a similar Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

the Oregon Supreme Court stated that:
[t]he function of this Supreme Court is no longer
to afford every losing litigant a forum to review
errors said to have been committed at trial or in
an administrative hearing. That function is now
placed in the Court of Appeals. Similarly, a party asserting that the Court of Appeals, in turn,
has erred cannot for that reason alone expect
further review in this Court. The process must
stop somewhere, and for most purposes this is at
the first level of appeal.
1000 Friends of Oregon v. Board of County Commissioners, Etc.,
584 P.2d 1371, 1372 (Or. 1978).
Much like this Court, Oregon requires a petitioner to
"present concrete reasons why the importance of an issue
transcends the importance of the case to the litigants."
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Id.

at 1373. Wilburn's petition in the instant case does not
encompass any legal issue which might "transcend the importance
of the case to the litigants", nor does it present any "special
and important reasons" for further review2.
supra.

See also n.l,

The issues arising out of the instant case are better

characterized as factual issues not likely to be repeated, and
which are susceptible to clarification and amendment in the
Industrial Commission.

See 1000 Friends, 584 P.2d at 1373 and

Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25-26.
A.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974) Is No Bar To
Enforceability Of The Settlement Agreement Because
Sufficient Evidence Supports The Commission's Finding
That The Parties Had A Good Faith Dispute As To The
Compensability Of Wilburn's Claim.

The Utah Court of Appeals held that Utah Code Ann.
§ 35-1-90 "is no bar to enforceability of the agreement."
Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.

In holding the Agreement to

be enforceable, the Court of Appeals emphasized that any
"compassion for the Applicant does not justify the erosion of a
principle and policy pertaining to compensation agreements
generally."

Ld.

2

Wilburn does not contend that this petition is based on any
of the character of reasons considered under Rule 43, Utah
Supreme Court Rules except for the allegation that it was
arbitrary and capricious to uphold the Settlement Agreement.
Under such circumstances, the Oregon Supreme Court counseled
that "it would be the better part of wisdom to abandon the
petition for review." 1000 Friends, 584 P.2d at 1373.
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In this regard, the Court of Appeals concluded that:
[W]e agree with the Administrative Law Judge that this
determination [a subsequent finding of compensability]
cannot "supplant the judgment of those who earlier, in
good faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful compensability." Since there is sufficient evidence to
support the Judge's finding that the parties had a
good faith dispute as to the compensability of the
claim, we defer to that determination.
Wilburn attempts to persuade this Court that application of
an objective standard of review to the facts of the instant
case would result in a finding that assertion of a "no accident" defense was not in good faith.
two important facts:

However, Wilburn ignores

First, this Court, and the Court of

Appeals are restricted in their review of Industrial Commission
factual conclusions.

McKay Dee Hospital v. Industrial

Commission, 598 P.2d 375, 376 (Utah 1979).

Second, this Court

n

give[s] maximum deference to the basic facts determined by the

agency, which will be sustained if there is evidence of any
substance that can be reasonably regarded as supporting the
determination made."

Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 735 P.2d

403, 405 (Utah App. 1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial
Commission, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah 1987)).
In the instant case the Court of Appeals properly gave
deference to the Industrial Commission's factual determinations.

Moreover, the Industrial Commission's approval of the

Settlement Agreement was not arbitrary or capricious,
especially where:
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Interstate's argument about the "compensability" of
Wilburn's claim was not altogether implausible given
the state of flux surrounding the definition of
"accident" at the time plaintiff's claim was filed.
(Citations omitted.)
Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. at 25.
B.

The Court Of Appeals Did Not Decide An Important
Question Of State Law, As Yet Undecided By This Court
Or In Conflict With A Decision Of This Court.

The Court of Appeals' decision is consistent with this
Court's holdings in Brigham Young University v. Industrial
Commission, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889 (1929); and Barber Asphalt
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266
(1943) (holding that settlements are appropriate when the
compensable nature of the worker's injury is disputed and the
worker's right to recover is doubtful).
Petitioner mischaracterizes the Court of Appeals' declaration that "it would have no difficulty in finding the
applicant's claim compensable." The issue is not whether the
judge or Court of Appeals believed the applicant had suffered a
compensable accident.

The real issue is "a matter of what the

parties believed and acted upon . . . " Ld.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals only reviewed the propriety of the Industrial Commission's factual determination
that:
The applicant clearly contemplated asserting a
claim for permanent total disability several months

-14-

before he executed the Compromise and Settlement
Agreement. There is no evidence of a "subsequent
change of condition or a new development not
contemplated at the time of the release or settlement
agreement." The stated basis for executing the
agreement was to avoid the necessity of further
litigating the "no accident" issue and, in doing so,
assuring the applicant of a continuation of his
medical benefits and some additional compensation.
There is no express provision that the agreement was a
tradeoff with respect to the applicant's potential
claim for permanent total disability, even though this
clearly was the understanding of the parties.
In Wilburn's case, he was advised to and did discuss
his claim with an attorney, but at the time he signed
the Compromise and Settlement Agreement, he was not
represented by counsel. He did, however, discuss the
Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the Commission's Legal Counsel, who approved the Settlement
after discussing all of its ramifications with the
Applicant. Based upon the testimony of the Commission's former legal counsel who approved this
particular Agreement, and based upon the Applicant's
own testimony, there can be little doubt that the
Applicant gave long and serious consideration to the
execution of the Agreement. This was not an Agreement
that was prepared on the spur of the moment and signed
hastily. It was, in fact, prepared weeks, if not
months, before it was actually executed. By his own
admission, the Applicant, at the time the Agreement
was signed, was extremely concerned about ensuring a
continuation of his medical benefits which were
assured if he agreed to the terms of the Compromise
and Settlement Agreement. If not, there is no doubt
that the Applicant understood the possibility of
losing that benefit if he were to lose his claim on
the issue of "no accident." (Emphasis added.)
(R. 373.)
Based on these factual determinations, the Court of Appeals
properly concluded that the Commission's findings were consistent with existing Utah law and should not be displaced.
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POINT II
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WILL NOT BE GRANTED FOR
AN APPEAL WHICH IS BASED ON A FACTUAL
DISPUTE.
One of the central functions of the writ of certiorari is
"to determine whether the inferior court exceeded its jurisdiction."

State v. McAllister, 708 P.2d 239 (Mont. 1985).

The

writ of certiorari must be preserved for issues of such great
legal importance that review is necessary.

The Industrial

Commission's sufficiently supported factual determinations are
not proper subjects of further appellate review because:
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether the
Commission's findings are "arbitrary and capricious"
or "wholly without cause" or contrary to the "one
[inevitable] conclusion from the evidence" or without
"any substantial evidence" to support them. Only then
should the Commission's findings be displaced.
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981).
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals determined that
"[a]lthough the evidence was in conflict, ample evidence
supports the judge's findings . . . "

Under these circum-

stances, further review would only be duplicative, and
unnecessary.
The major contentions in Wilburn's petition are that, as a
factual matter:

(1) the compensability of Wilburn's claim was

not disputed; (2) he did not settle his claims for permanent
total disability benefits; and (2) the Commission and Court of
Appeals misapplied the parol evidence rule.
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In making

these arguments, Wilburn ignores the function of this Court
when reviewing Industrial Commission factual determinations.
This Court has consistently held that deference must be
given to fact finders especially where, as here, the Legislature has comprehensively delegated responsibility over a
particular subject to a specialized administrative agency.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1987).

See, e.g., Department of

Administrative Services v. Public Serv. Commission, 658 P.2d
601, 608-10 (Utah 1983); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Brimhall,
28 Utah 2d 14, 16, 497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972).
Wilburn's argument that Section 35-1-90 makes the
Settlement Agreement invalid is misplaced for two reasons.
First, Wilburn must acknowledge that settlements are appropriate when compensability is disputed.
supra.

See Brigham Young,

Second, the Commission concluded, as a factual matter,

that "Interstate's argument about the 'compensability of
Wilburn's claim was not altogether implausible . . .' since
there is sufficient evidence to support the judge's finding
that the parties had a good faith dispute."
Adv. Rep. at 25, n.3 (R. 38.)

Wilburn, 74 Utah

Because this Court gives

deference to the Commission's factual findings, no additional
review is necessary.

Review of Wilburn's claim that he did not

intend to settle his claim for permanent total disability is
not necessary for the same reason.
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(R. 341.)

Wilburn's claim that the Commission and Court of Appeals
improperly applied the parol evidence rule is likewise flawed
for two reasons.

First, although interpretation of contract is

generally a question of law, where as here, the contract is
ambiguous, "the process of resolving ambiguities

...

require[s] the consideration of evidence, and conflicts in
evidence will need to be resolved by the trier of fact."
Morris v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. 658 P.2d
1199, 1201 (Utah 1983).

See also Overson v. U.S.F-&G., 587

P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1978).

Second, because conflicting evi-

dence was introduced to clarify contractual ambiguities, the
Commission interpreted the contract, through a factual inquiry
and determination.

On review, the Court of Appeals concluded

that "[allthough the evidence was in conflict, ample evidence
supports the judge's findings. . . . "

Wilburn, 74 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 24. Once again the Court of Appeals properly deferred
to the Commission's factual determinations.
CONCLUSION
The determination of whether the Industrial Commission
properly approved Wilburn's Settlement Agreement is a factual
matter which must be ultimately decided by the Industrial
Commission.

Because each case is unique, the Industrial

Commission must exercise its discretion in making such
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factually governed decisions.

In the instant case, the Utah

Court of Appeals and the Industrial Commission based their
decisions that "the agreement was a validly executed settlement
of a disputed claim" on ample supporting evidence.
Thus, the petition fails to demonstrate any legal decision
by the Court of Appeals which either creates new law, conflicts
with current law, or otherwise necessitates a decision by this
Court,

For these reasons, Wilburn's petition should be denied.

DATED this 18th day of April, 1988.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

"W^cv^
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SCMLRL124
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